The Berlin Wall’s Demise

The events leading up to the Wall’s demise occurred with dramatic speed. Like the small trickle in a leaky dam that becomes a torrent, GDR policies, miscommunication, and Soviet refusal to intervene resulted in more than 133,000 East German citizens moving to the West in 1989. More than anything, a persistent call for freedom to travel by hundreds of thousands of people eventually helped bring down the Wall.

  • November 1-10, 1989

Egon Krenz, the communist head of state of East Germany (GDR), visited Moscow on November 1st. He had been presented with unmistakable and irrefutable evidence, largely ignored by his predecessor Erich Honecker, of an economically dying nation. Honecker’s blind denial of absolute fact led to his removal from his position the previous month, replaced by Krenz. Krenz appealed to Mikhail Gorbachev for Soviet economic assistance. Gorbachev explained quite firmly that the Soviet Union was not in a position to provide that assistance and the discussion turned to other matters. Gorbachev also demurred on any discussion concerning a possible reunification between the two Germanys as it was not an item on the Soviet Union’s political agenda. This effectively shut the door on any Soviet interference to address the increasing numbers of East German citizens moving to the West and as a result of this meeting and popular pressure, the travel requirements by GDR citizens to Czechoslovakia were eased again. GDR citizens would no longer need a visa and a passport to travel there.

On November 3, officials in Czechoslovakia (CSSR) informed the GDR ambassador that no effort to establish refugee camps for the flood of GDR citizens arriving in the CSSR would be taken. Officials told the ambassador that GDR had two choices: one, “introduce measures to end the influx of ‘political refugees’ [into the CSSR] or two, organise a clearance procedure so that ‘as many former GDR citizens can leave the CSSR for West Germany (FRG) every day as arrive daily in the FRG embassy in Prague ’“.[ii] Czech officials and the people had found it noteworthy that the GDR allowed the West German embassy in Prague handle the influx of East German citizens, some 6,000 at the time, rather than centrally control the process in East Berlin.

The East German SED Politburo, the seat of power in East Germany, met in an afternoon session on November 3 to allow those 6,000 GDR citizens staying on the West German embassy grounds in Prague to depart for West Germany without returning first to East Germany. This decision also guaranteed their citizenship status and allowed them unequivocal access back into the GDR. Krenz gave a television and radio broadcast that night that promised quick release of an accompanying draft new travel bill, but gave no specifics. In his speech he declared “no going back” for political reform and implored GDR citizens to remain in the country. Krenz then made preparations to handle the next day’s massive demonstrations on East Berlin’s Alexanderplatz at which up to 500,000 people were expected. Some 40 other towns and cities across the GDR also had protest rallies scheduled. In light of the increasing vocal and physical protests, up to and including booing Politburo member Günter Schabowski off the stage with shouts of “Abtreten!” (get off the stage!), the Volkspolizei was ordered to move to the background, but other “social forces” were made ready at the Brandenburg Gate to prevent any overt effort to break through to the border.[iii] The GDR government hadn’t quite given up on themselves.

On November 6, the GDR government released the new travel bill that Krenz had promised and a new storm of outrage erupted. The 30-day travel limit per year and the ill-defined reasons why application to travel could be denied were found unacceptable. A new round of protests occurred throughout the country. Meanwhile, in Bonn, one of Krenz’s representatives secretly appealed to West German officials for new loan guarantees, ostensibly to help pay for the GDR citizens now appearing in West Germany through the CSSR. The West Germans used noncommittal delaying tactics to the point that Krenz now understood his options had run out.[iv] West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl realized that his negotiating power had risen substantially and through discussions between officials, expressed the willingness of West Germany to provide financial and material help to the GDR in exchange for the GDR’s guarantee “that the formation of opposition groups will be permitted and affirm that it will hold free elections within a period yet to be announced. It should be noted that this path is possible only if the SED gives up its claim to absolute power.”[v]

On the next day, November 8, 1989, the entire GDR Politburo resigned in an effort to resolve the growing crisis of East Germans fleeing the country, which amounted to 350 per hour. Egon Krenz stayed in power, however, and continued working with the Central Committee of the SED.[vi] Finally bowing to reality, the Interior Minister then made a public announcement to confirm and recognize that the opposition group “Neues Forum” was a recognized association. The CSSR then increased the pressure on the GDR by detailing complaints of CSSR citizens in Bohemia of their failure to understand why GDR citizens had been allowed to migrate to West Germany (BRD) through the BRD embassy. They then requested that the GDR allow their citizens to emigrate directly into West Germany without involving CSSR territory.

On Thursday, November 9, Gerhard Lauter, a colonel in the GDR’s interior ministry and three of his colleagues met to discuss and write yet another new draft of travel regulations meant to address the torrent of opposition most recently voiced. Chronik der Mauer web site explains: “The [Lauter] group soon agrees that, in future, all restrictions regarding applications to leave the GDR permanently should be dropped. The officers consider it irresponsible, however, to force all those wanting to leave the country to take on the status of emigrants. They want to preserve the GDR. For this reason, they include regulations regarding the right to ‘private trips,’ i.e. visits, in the Council [of Minister’s] resolution, along with those concerning permanent departure. Applications are still to be made for permission to travel or leave the country. The State Security Service expects the general populace to react with a rush – but a rush on the relevant authorities (the Volkspolizei district offices), not a rush on the border.”[vii]

A key element in the document stipulated release of the information for the next day at 4:00 a.m. This was to allow for subordinate units and border control offices time to be notified. Lauter and his group had discussed the points expressed in the document heatedly during their session, but in the end, they discounted the guidance they had received from the Politburo’s Central Committee. Lauter had a staff member type the document; he signed and stamped it, then released it for courier delivery to Krenz and the Central Committee.

Krenz received the document and read it verbatim to the Central Committee, which was in session. Günter Schabowski was absent, however. No one objected to the language in the document and no discussion ensued. After the Central Committee’s meeting ended, Krenz located Schabowski and gave the document to him along with a press release. These papers were needed for the upcoming 6:00 p.m. press conference, which was only minutes away. Krenz failed to mention that the information within the document should not be released until the next day at 4 a.m.

While Schabowski had officially resigned from the Politburo, he was still appointed as SED (the East German communist party) spokesman. He would lead the upcoming press conference, accompanied by three of the Central Committee members. Some 200 international journalists, including NBC’s Tom Brokaw and his camera and sound crew, were scheduled to attend.

In a video interview[viii] after the news conference, Brokaw explained that he and his colleagues listened to the largely boring presentation and dozed somewhat in the process as they had just arrived from the U.S. that morning and were exhausted. Shortly before 7 p.m., however, an Italian journalist asked Schabowski about the newest travel regulations. Schabowski had completely forgotten about discussing the points contained in the document that Krenz had given him earlier and after he had shuffled through his papers looking for it, eventually locating it with the help of a staffer, he began reading it verbatim. Again, Schabowski did not know that the information was to be withheld (Youtube)).[ix]

The fact that a senior SED member would actually field questions from the press and answer those questions live and unfiltered was itself a remarkable event never before seen (Hertle, 1999).[x]

The question from the Italian journalist queried Schabowski if the previous set of travel regulations so vociferously denounced a few days before was a mistake. In a matter of only a few days, several sets of regulations had been drafted and announced, the most recent angrily rejected by the populace. Schabowski responded to the contrary, but was interrupted by another journalist who asked specifically when the new regulation would take effect. Another journalist asked the same question. Brokaw noted in his video interview that immediately, the journalists and others in the room perked up at Schabowski’s words and the resulting questions from the floor. In response to the questions and the newer intensity within the room, Schabowski looked through his papers, seemed to find the answer to the question, “When?” and answered, “Immediately, without delay.”[xi] This response had a stunning impact within the room. The journalists questioned themselves and each other if they had heard correctly, according to Brokaw. With that, the press conference ended at 7 p.m.

Brokaw said that he had previously scheduled an appointment with Schabowski, followed him upstairs, sat him down, and invited him to once again read from that piece of paper from which he had made that startling announcement. Schabowski confirmed what he had said, announced that the decision had been made, and assured that the borders, even to West Berlin, would be opened, responding to Brokaw’s questions in English.[xii]

Meanwhile, at 7:05 p.m., the news broke around the world first with the Associated Press: “GDR Opens Borders.”

While the Wall did not open immediately, GDR citizens began gathering at the crossover points at Invalidenstrasse and Bornholmerstrasse, among others. The Stasi told the border guards to defer people and send them back until the next day, but the crowds continued to gather. The problem became acute and absent orders from higher authority, the GDR State Security Service opted to allow a “valve” solution. This stopgap measure meant to allow the most vocal and insistent people through the border gradually upon presentation of a passport. Unbeknownst to these people, their identity papers were stamped alongside their photo. This stamp effectively removed their citizenship and prevented their return to East Germany. Absent instruction from senior GDR officials, who remained silent through the night, confusion and drama continued to build at the Wall’s crossover points. By 10:00 p.m., the situation at Bornholmerstrasse had become volatile as people continued to gather and press in toward the passport control officers; the “valve” solution proved to be an unworkable solution. Those who had gone through the border and returned were allowed back in.

The decisions made by the lieutenant colonel in charge of the Bornholmerstrasse control point had a cascading effect. At midnight, all Wall crossover points were opened. The border guards no longer told GDR citizens that they should go home and wait till the next day and for those that returned in short order, they were allowed back in. The press of humanity had become untenable.[xiii]

Finally, after 28 years, the Berlin Wall was gone. While it would be several years before the Wall’s physical presence was removed, the barrier itself was now just a speed bump. The people of eastern Europe had spoken over the past year. Little by little, their voices were heard. Eventually, their expressed wishes were granted by a political system that permitted freedom only on the state’s terms.